5; Blom & LaFarge A,E-4,5 (1925) 1927 NV9 Tzeltal NV9

Revolutions have since destroyed the herds, and the town now has only a small local trade in sugar and rum.

All goods are transported on mule-back over bad trails. Main trails run to Yajalon, San Cristóbal las Casas, and Comitan. Minor trails connect with Tenosique in Tabasco, a ride of five or six days through uninhabited forests. Other small trails lead into the heart of the forests along the Usumacinta river, where there are a few mahogany camps, fourteen days distance on a good mule.

The Spanish Conquerors had quickly discovered the richness of the soil and taken possession of it. Therefore, we find but a few Indians around Ocosingo, save at the small town of Sivacá, entirely inhabited by Tzeltal-speaking Indians. From there we secured our labourers, who were summoned by the municipal president and worked for us at the regulation pay of 50 centavos per day. Ocosingo holds sway over the native towns of Sivacá, Tenango, Oschuc, San Martin, and Bachajon. The municipality commands the Indians for all kinds of work, and in many ways lives on what can be pressed from them. As a consequence, the good people of Ocosingo are anything but popular among the Indians, though it appears that the man then in charge, Señor Simon Leon, was quite friendly towards them, and therefore well liked.

Geologically, the Ocosingo Valley is a syncline, the valley bottom and the interior mountain ranges being of a coarse red sandstone, and the exterior ranges of limestone. The axis of the valley runs approximately N-80-W to S-80-E, and Ocosingo town is located at an altitude of 900 meters above sea level.

As we rode into the village, La Farge discovered a stone block, carved with hieroglyphs, set in the pavement of the sidewalk, an excellent reception for archaeologists.

Our first concern was to find quarters, which we located in a house on the corner of a street leading into the Plaza. Soon our equipment was unloaded, and while we unpacked, the Ladino guide we had acquired in Bachajon went to his house to order food for us.

The restaurant and meal were a surprise, though not pleasant. In a room with a rotten board floor, the plaster falling off the walls, and a huge box full of saints, we were served fried eggs and black beans by an old woman with a large goitre. Though nothing in the house appeared to be either particularly exclusive or clean, the Ladino family seemed to resent that we sat down at the table with our chief guide, the trusty old Indian, Lázaro, now called "Tata" by us.

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423 tlements were assigned to one of the two sections of the division in the
621 center with an attempt being made to maintain a demographic balance.
166 Incorporation of the new settlements was more effective in the case of the barrios than in the case of the colonias, which were farther away from the town center and included Indians of diverse communities. The process of
175 breaking away from the old community is illustrated by the 1961 move for
423 independence made by the original settlers of the colonia of Caralampio.
621 The following account was given by a man who was then secretary of the
661 ejido:
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The first settlers of San Caralampio, José, Pablo, Luciano, and Santos were self-appointed principales, *or head men, of the colony. Santos and Luciano were from the town center, and José and Pablo had worked on the ranch when it was privately owned. The colony was well populated and the people lived well—there were no fights nor any problems. In 1956 the four principales decided that they should separate from the center. They told the people that if each person would contribute twenty-five pesos, they would raise the issue of the division in the* Departamento Agraria Mixta. *José invited Mateo, a man who knew how to read and write, to help them.*

"Let's divide from the town so that we alone will run the colony," he told them.

The principales took the money contributed and went to Tuxtla. There, in the Liga de Communidad Agraria *they asked for the separation, and were referred to the* Departamento Agraria Mixta. *When they arrived there with their request, the commissioner said that he would have to communicate with the chief in Mexico.*

After this, Pablo came one day to the center. He spoke to the ejido commission: "Look here, José, Luciano and Mateo went to Tuxtla."

"What for?" asked the ejido president.

"They asked for a division from the town."

"Que pendejo!" *said the president. "What happened?"*

"What do you think?" asked Pablo.

"We are against it. If it was a new center, we would support you. But

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we are against division," said the president. "How much did you have to contribute?" he asked Pablo.

"Twenty-five pesos. They told us if we do not give money, we will be thrown out of the colonia."

We advised him that it would be better not to continue giving money to the principales. "You can't make this division," we told him.

One Sunday all the pueblo united in a mass meeting. Everyone was present. People asked about the affair of San Caralampio, and the Ejido Commission explained to them what had happened. The people said, "Let's get rid of them [the four principales of San Caralampio]."

When the three principales returned to San Caralampio from Tuxtla they asked each household head to contribute fifty pesos in order to send them to Mexico to talk personally with the Chief of the Ejido Division. Pablo came the next day to talk to the president in the center and advised them that the principales had gone out. There was another meeting. The president's decision was to get a contribution of one peso from each person in the center so that they would have six hundred pesos to prevent the division. They feared that if this occurred the people of the center couldn't work down there.

When the leaders of the central Ejido Commission had received the money, they went to the departmental capital to explain to the chief of the ejido zone what had happened. They said that the leaders of the colonia had gone to Mexico.

"Let's to go work!" said the chief. "Did you bring the money?"

"Yes, we have six hundred pesos."

"Go to the bank and change it into one-hundred-peso bills," said the chief. "Let us send two hundred pesos to the chief of the division in Mexico so that he will prevent the division."

We sent the money airmail. Before the principales of San Caralampio had arrived, we had their way blocked. Our money went to work for us. In five days, the chief in Las Casas said the money had been well received, and the leaders of San Caralampio had not been received.

A week later, Pablo came to see how the affair had proceeded. We asked Pablo if he had contributed money. He said no. We told him,

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"Don't give any more money. The Ejido Commission won't let the division happen since we are the same pueblo."

The four principales returned from Mexico. They said that they had a paper and that an engineer would come. They asked for another contribution of 25 pesos. They said that those who wouldn't pay would be thrown out. Pablo came and told us. We told him not to be afraid. The principales now knew that Pablo was with us. He had two brothers, Pancho and Ignacio, whom he advised not to go along with the principales since he knew that they would not win the case. When the principales returned to ask for more money for their trips to Tuxtla, both brothers refused.

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Since these three brothers did not cooperate, the principales got angry and decided to kill Pablo. One day, when Pablo was on his way to Teopisca, he was shot in the back. He continued riding 76 meters. The horse returned to his house. His wife ran to tell his two brothers that the horse had come home without a rider. The brothers ran out and found Pablo dead. The civil authorities of the town went. A few days passed. The brothers never asked for justice. But since they knew who did it, one of them took Pablo's 16-centimeter rifle. Pablo's wife had been thinking of selling it to pay for the expenses of the funeral. Pancho [Pablo's brother] said, "No wait. I will buy it as soon as I have money."

He borrowed it for several years. One Sunday there was an order for all of the people of San Caralampio to go to the pueblo. They got up early and wakened all the others with a horn. Pancho got up with his rifle. He went to Juan's house and shot him. Luciano had Pancho jailed in the department capitol. He declared his crime, and said that he had killed Juan because the latter had shot his brother. He made a good statement. For this reason, he got out very cheaply—1500 pesos—which he paid with his crop of beans and corn. He was in prison in San Caralampio three months. Now he lives in Teopisca. His sons go to work there, but he doesn't. One day, Pancho was shot in the back—I don't know how many centimeters the bullet penetrated, but he did not die. The brothers of Juan and José have all left the colonia.

José was the one who caused all of the trouble. His wife was the younger sister of Pablo and she left him. Now José is going around begging for food to eat.

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The action of the Ejido Commission of the town reveals the knowledge of how to manipulate political and economic power. By sending the 200-peso bribe, they were able to block the independence movement before the leadership had arrived. The extreme tactics used by the independence leaders in killing their opponents approximates the kind of political homicide characteristic of the central plateau (Friedrich 1962). The Indians of the center have been able to maintain their ejido grants intact. However, the political discrimination against residents of both colonias and barrios—no resident of either (except for the Huistecan mentioned above) has been elected president, and they never serve in any post higher than that of assistant judge—will undoubtedly lead to further unrest as the populations expand.

Bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption minimize the potential effectiveness of the ejido organization at local, state, and national levels. Projects undertaken by the national government lose their effectiveness when they are promoted by fraudulent claims, taking advantage of the presumed illiteracy and ignorance of the peasantry. The following case illustrates both the tactics of the ejido agents and the countertactics of the local Indians, resulting in a stalemate in the development projects planned and projected at the national level.

In August, two years ago, the Ejido Bank agents came to town with an offer to lend money on crops. We didn't want to borrow it, but Francisco, carbrón! [*then president of the town*], *said we should do it. "Good," we said. We accepted their terms. They said, "We will give fertilizer. It won't cost you a cent. We have tried it. It will give a good crop. We will give you money every six months, and you will pay the interest of nine percent. We will pay for all the costs. It won't cost you anything for the fertilizer."*

In six months, when the bank agents came to get the interest, they charged us six hundred pesos for the fertilizer. We did not want to receive the second load of fertilizer. We presented our case to the Jefe *and told him, "Why did you say it would not cost anything?" He replied, "No,* muchacho [*boy*], *I told you* [*using the familiar form* te dije] *that the fertilizer is going to cost."*

We used seven bags of fertilizer on each hectare for which they charged

us 65 pesos per bag. It was the first time we had used it and we had very good crops. We got together and decided not to pay for the fertilizer. We called the bank agents and requested that we be relieved of the charge because the crops had failed. We showed him a milpa which is a low plot that is too wet for a good crop. We just throw the seed there, but don't work on it because it isn't worth the trouble.

We went to a lawyer in Tuxtla. He told us the bank would have to pay for the fertilizer since they had promised it. The lawyer is the helper of the campesinos [*poor farmers*].

Several points of significance can be noted in this case: (1) the Indians are reluctant to take credit risks because of unfortunate experiences in the past; (2) they react to deception with their own deceptions, showing the engineer the land which had not only not been fertilized but had never been weeded or cared for; and (3) they seek professional legal aid in dealing with government agents in order to equalize the contest in which they feel disadvantaged. These first two behavioral syndromes are culturally conditioned responses; the third represents an innovation. By seeking professional aid for which they pay a fee, the Indians are breaking the monopoly of power held by the caciques to whom they were formerly bound in a network of personal obligations incurred in such transactions.

Recent colonization of national lands since the 1950s has introduced a new kind of ejido settlement. Since most of the lands contiguous to settled towns were absorbed in the early days of the ejido grant, movement has been into lands outside the domain of established centers. This spontaneous colonization of unexploited land has followed the penetration of new highways in Quintana Roo, Campeche, Chiapas, Tabasco, and Vera Cruz (de la Peña 1951:348). In defense of their rights to the new lands, the colonists, often of diverse origins, develop a political consciousness. Mestizos and Indians of different towns work together in securing official ejido status for their lands. Acculturation to the national language and ways of life is much greater in these mixed centers than in the settled populations that were part of the original ejido tracts. Consciousness of their rights under national law and independence from traditional loyalties means that these new settlements may be the basis for welding Indians into the na-

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cause of the limited capital involved and the fear of discovery with the expansion of the enterprise. A loose syndicate of distillers provides an insurance protection by raising fines for members who are apprehended by federal agents. Security measures are taken to avoid discovery, and the presence of a federal agent is announced in Tzeltal on the loudspeaker system of one of the bars. One federal agent is on the payroll of the four operating bar owners, who give him 5 pesos a week to avoid legal action on the sale of contraband liquor. Individual distillers pay the tariff of 10 pesos or two liters of liquor a year to the civil officials and to the ejido commission, a tariff justified by the fact that they use wood from communally owned land to cook the sugar. The syndicate is a community-wide organization, mobilized in emergencies only.

The New Social Resources

In the course of operating the new enterprises, knowledge of and experience with supralocal institutions and agents are developing social resources in (1) entrepreneurship, (2) management of capital and credit, (3) knowledge of markets, and (4) dealing with government agencies. In entering into these new economic activities, the Indians have not lost a sense of belonging to the local community. Self-identification as poor, indigenous farmers is both a screen of protection and a means of ensuring continuity with local control systems.

Entrepreneurship. Local entrepreneurs explain their motivation in a rhetoric which emphasizes their interest in community welfare. This validates entering into nontraditional activities, but retaining their position in local society inhibits the expansions of their activities. The case of Santos, the promoter of the trucking cooperative is instructive. Santos had picked up some accounting techniques while he served in the army in Michoacán. He returned to the village because his father walked from Chiapas to Michoacán to tell him he should come back and get married. When he returned, he kept careful account of his costs and returns from the milpa. He realized soon that it wasn't "worth his work" (the Indian has not as yet learned the idiom or the value system which goes into the

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474 The strategies the cooperative members have developed in their frequent
648 tangles with state police illustrate the combination of custom and innova-
661 tion. When caught red-handed, they may respond by playing the stereotype Indian role. "We don't know anything. We are just poor Indians. How do you expect us to do what the law says?" This is hard for the Ladino authorities to resist, since it feeds their own sense of superiority. But it does not always work, and so the Indians have devised secondary resources. They put the departmental police at each terminal of their usual route between Las Casas and Comitán on a regular monthly mordida pay-
[693] roll of 50 pesos each. When trying to extend their operations, they hire a lawyer. A recent coup has been the acquisition of a permit to truck corn from Villa las Rosas and other ejido settlements that have been recently colonized. The appeal was made on the basis that they are a nonprofit cooperative of ejidatarios. With the permit, they now undercut the price of their own competitors in the town as well as of the large companies. Law-
474 yers are beginning to advertise themselves in newspapers as "Friends of
693 the Indians" and are in some cases specializing in this new patronage, which they receive from other communities as well as Tzo'ontahal. The professional relationship bypasses personal ties which formerly limited the development of Indian leadership.

177 The self-development occurring in Tzo'ontahal may appear paradoxical
178 if we do not understand the internal dynamics by which change is con-
474 tained within an existing equilibrium. The cooperative association has
621 been adopted as a technique for socializing the risk of making a profit.
648 The truck, although currently used in an uneconomic operation, is a sym-
[493] bol of power in the struggle for a position in the regional markets and in the intracommunity factional strifes. The usual patron-client system is being reversed as the Indian puts the Ladino on his payroll to secure evasion from the law. In the changes which are occuring, the defensive structure of the corporate community is a means by which the Indians are entering into national life not on the lowest rung of the social ladder, but on terms they are setting for themselves. In the new enterprises, the Indians combine old ploys with new strategies. Confronted with legal threats from the outside world, they play the colonial game of defensive ignorance.

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In the strategy of incorporating new leadership, these tactics are employed.

1. The four regidores are assigned the task of bringing the novice scribe to the town authorities. They are the official recruiters for civil and religious office.

2. The request is made to the parent of the appointed scribe in the formal speech of the pat?o?tan. The appeal is cast in terms of the sacred nature of the task with reference to the "holy" nature of the post to be undertaken on this "holy hour, holy day and holy year."

3. The contractual relationship is initiated as always with a drinking session. The scribe is introduced into the drinking order as fourth in rank. The officials show solicitude as he is taught to drink "the gift of the gods and the ancestors." Once the gift of liquor has been accepted, the recipient has no recourse except to fulfill the obligation.

These tactics, used also in other contractual arrangements, were inadequate to the task of inducting foreign Indians living in the township into the traditional hierarchy. In 1929, a Huistecan Indian, Augustín, who had worked as a laborer in a finca within the township, became president. Although he could not read, he was able to speak Spanish fluently. He succeeded in getting the first ejido grant under the land reform act of 1927.

During his term of office, Augustín was accused of abusing his authority on several occasions, as the following account shows:

When I was very young, my father told me about this land case. Augustín was president then. He tried to get land from my uncle's father-in-law, Juan. My uncle, Bartolo, defended his father-in-law's right to the land because he had good friends in Tuxtla. Augustín spoke Spanish very well, but he did not know how to read. Since my uncle knew how to read well, he gained the case. Augustín was angry. He invited all the curers to the town hall and ordered the police to bring in my uncle. My uncle was given something in a cup of liquor, and in three days he died.

Even if this story is untrue, or distorted because of the family relationship of the narrator and the victim, it reveals the sense of being exploited

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622 or abused by leaders from outside the community. Stories by other informants indicate that Augustín took advantage of his power as president. He was accused of charging high fines in court and pocketing the money. Finally a case against him was brought to the Ministerio Publico in the departmental capital. The denunciation is recounted by Ceferino, the scribe, who replaced him as president:

159 *The court's decision was that Augustín had to return the three hundred*
622 *and fifty pesos that he had forced out of Juan in the land case. Augustín*
661 *claimed that it was difficult for him to pay the fine. He said he would pay*
609 *it in installments. Juan wanted it right away. After a month, the money*
[692] *still was not handed over. I spoke to the Ministerio Publico who told Augustín to sell his cattle. The pueblo wanted to seize the cattle. Augustín got frightened, and said he would sell his cattle. He sold them. After this he never returned to work in the pueblo.*

There were no killings in this affair. Eight days after he gave the money, Augustín came to the town hall with a pistol. I noticed it and said, "Better come in an register this pistol." He ignored this and spoke to the judge for a while.

I told a policeman, "Go get the pistol and register it." The policeman was afraid. I asked him, "Why are you afraid?" He said, "I am afraid." I said, "You have turned into a woman."

The policeman seized Augustín's arms. I went behind and took the pistol out of his hand. Augustín said, "Why are you taking my pistol? I have committed no crime."

I replied, "You came to bother the people here." I took away the pistol.

Augustín also knew how to wear a watch. His son bought it from a thief for one hundred and twenty-five pesos. We also took his watch because it was stolen. I told him, "Go look for work and earn money. The Ministerio Publico has given orders that you cannot continue working here. You cannot rob here any more."

He went away for two months, and then came back to get his things and moved to Teopisca.

621 Despite this successful denunciation, Augustín's son, Juan, tried to "get
609 control of the town." He and the other Huistecans of the barrio of Yeta-
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The rights over land given to the villages by the Spaniards were not contested by the Mexican Government, but during the last century there have been some redistributions of the boundaries to better fit changes in the size of the population of the different villages in the area. Besides, although it was not legally approved, large chunks of the territory of the communities were taken away by the local ranchers who had the backing of the state politicians. As a result of the land invasion by the ranchers, the villages of Amatenango and Aguacatenango controlled, until recently in this century, very little land, mostly temporal, the better land being in the hands of the local ladino ranchers.

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After the Mexican Revolution of the twenties, the fincas (ranches) were expropriated by the national government, according to new policies of agrarian reform, and under the presidential regime of Avila Camacho were returned to the villages as Ejidos (cooperatively owned land).

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The territory of the villages is divided today, by use, into land for agriculture (?ulabal [irrigated], pomultik [hot-country] and temporal), land for residential sites, and land for lumbering and pasture. Within the communities the over-all authority that controls land is the Ayuntamiento, the body which forms the civil branch of the civil-religious government that is the ultimate authority in village affairs. The Ayuntamiento controls both the communal lands and the Ejido lands.

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The Ejidos function very much like the communal lands, in that they are "owned" by the community. Every household head is a member of the ejido cooperative, and has rights to cultivate a parcel within the ejido. According to the Mexican Agrarian Code,

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